Part 16 - The appearance and construction of Democracy - childhood to maturity in Greece
/As discussed in The appearance and construction of Democracy - childhood to maturity in Greece, Part 11, Athens was considerably weakened militarily due to the alliance between Sparta and the Persian empire. Athens was deeply humiliated by the settlement agreed to in 404 and while internally independent, was quite vulnerable, now with no protective walls or army of much substance and subordinate to Sparta. Athens was careful to follow the terms of the settlement over the next nine years. By 395, a chance to recover independence and return to being a strong Greek power began to appear.
The now restored democracy was quick to see this and the long-running problem of Athenian desire for empire and power began to reassert itself (again). As described previously, a desire for power and expansion leading to frequent war was a major flaw in Athenian foreign policy during the fifth century and this continued into the fourth in an even more damaging manner.
“The activist spirit of the demos had not been blunted by defeat, and a hankering to repeat old glories persisted. The risk that ambition might overreach itself was increased by the fact that the right of the assembly to decide foreign policy had few checks in law, a constitutional weakness that had not been remedied by in the reforms of 403. When it came to international relations, including issues of war and peace, the power of the demos was unchecked. It could rule by decree.”(Mitchell)
The seeds of the opportunity for Athens to rebuild was the mercy shown by Sparta by not dealing with Athens more harshly. Crucial allies such as Corinth and Thebes, had wanted to eliminate Athens as a military and economic rival but Sparta ignored their appeals. Demonstrating that drive for power and empire was by no means restricted to Athens, and despite having presented itself as the liberator of numerous Greek states, Sparta proceeded to create its own empire, taking control of the Aegean and imposing oligarchic systems on most of the former colonies of Athens. In addition, in 401 Sparta chose to intervene in Persia, supporting Cyrus, who was in rebellion against his older brother, King Artaxerxes. However, Cyrus was defeated and killed the same year. Sparta persisted in challenging Persia by sending an army in 396 to support Ionian cities that were threatened by Persia. Artaxerxes, responded by building up the Persian navy and quite cleverly, appointing an Athenian general to command it.
This was not the first time and would not be the last that Persia, and later Macedonia, would seek to take advantage of the historic enmity between many Greek states. As part of trying to weaken Sparta as much as possible, Persia worked vigorously to encourage Sparta’s allies, as well as Thebes and Athens, to go to war with Sparta, in exchange for Persian gold. Triggered by a dispute between two minor Greek states, an alliance was created between Thebes, Corinth, Argos, Athens, and some smaller states. Thus, in 394, the Corinthian War began. The combination of these Greek states and the Persia, was too much for Sparta resulting in a resounding defeat. The Persians then allowed their fleet under the command of the Athenian general to go to Piraeus (Athens historic and crucial Port) with gold to rebuild the Athen long walls and the fortifications of Athens and the Piraeus.
By 391, Athens had regained its confidence with its defenses rebuilt and an influx of Persian capital. Unfortunately, the cancer of arrogance, power, and empire came out of remission and quickly reasserted itself. Athens began to rebuild its Aegean empire. In its weakened position, Sparta petitioned Persia for peace focused on giving the Ionian Greek states (part of Athen’s former empire) to Persia. With acceptance from Persia and rejection of a counter proposal, Athens then turned to Sparta, proposing that the Asian Greek states go to Persia, 3 additional States would go to Athens, and the rest of the Greek states would be autonomous. Although Sparta agreed, this arrangement was rejected by the Athenian Assembly. “The decision is telling evidence of the mood of the demos, intent much more on adding to the catalogue of decisions favoring war, not peace, and determined that Athens, not Sparta, would rule the Aegean.”(Mitchell) Not only did the Assembly reject the proposal, they prosecuted those who had negotiated it for treason and sent them in to exile. The Assembly also voted to impose a special tax to build a new fleet.
The goal of this new initiative was to stop Sparta from gaining a foothold in Aegean states and secure control of the Hellespont (present day Turkey) and access to the Black sea (primary source of wheat - from present day Ukraine!).
The Athenian plan met with some success but ultimately was unable to dislodge Sparta from enough of the northern Aegean. By this time, the Persian king had became intent on stabilizing the issue of the Ionian Greeks and Greeks in general. Envoys from all of the states were invited to meet to hear the king’s terms for peace. The king proposed the same conditions outlined above from the Athenian negotiation with Sparta and added the key caveat that he would got to war against any state who did not accept his peace offer. All the of the participants in the Corinthian War pledged to abide by the terms offered.
The king’s peace did not ease the cancerous rivalry and conflict in Greece. Initially, Sparta increasingly benefited, gradually expanding control of key areas in the region. Athens was careful to avoid conflict in the latter part of the 380s and focused on building up its military. Athens then launched a new initiative to form what is termed the Second Athenian League. All independent Greek state were invited to join with the focus being to resist Sparta. Athens was careful to avoid the structure of the Delian League which had allowed transformation from an alliance to an Athenian empire. The new League grew gradually, and likely reached a membership as high as 70 States.
“The league was a farsighted initiative that created a broad alliance of Greek states that offer genuine mutual benefits, respected the traditions and independence of each member, and gave protection against domination by the leading power. It did not require a high level of political integration of the allies, but did provide a high level of added security through collective action jointly agreed and implemented using the experience leadership Athens could provide. It was a model of a federation that has a potential to counteract the volatility of Greek politics and break the ruinous cycle of war between Greeks. It could also provide a strong bulwark against external threats.”(Mitchell)
The League was able to contain the expansionism of Sparta but was prevented from continuing due to a lack of funds, principally due to Thebes failing to make its contributions. As a result, a peace conference was held with agreement reached by most to abide by the same conditions as the King’s peace. Thebes refused to participate and Sparta immediately attacked resulting in a crushing defeat that ended Spartan power in mid to northern Greece. As a result, Athens began to see Thebes as a greater threat than Sparta. After continuing setbacks for Sparta, primarily by Thebes, in a major reversal, Athens sought an alliance with Sparta. So the ally Thebes becomes an enemy and the enemy Sparta becomes an ally. The new alliance proceeded in warfare with Thebes.
As I will outline in the next post, after another fifteen years of nearly continuous war, the Athenian state would be impoverished, again.